Abstract
ever, they spend most of their lives growing in estuarine and inshore areas where many shrimp 81 fisheries occur. The features of annual life cycles and extremely high fecundity rates imply that 82 the annual shrimp stock recruitment could be regarded as being independent of the previous 83 year's stock and harvest. As such, it is reasonable to assume exogenous recruitment. We de-84 rive the optimal policy from the perspective of a social planner and the planner's objective is 85 to choose the harvest path to maximize the total present value profits from harvesting.
86

The problem of optimal Harvest
87
Let p(t) indicate the price of fish per unit at time t and Q(t) be the harvest in weight at time t.
88
Let C denote the cost function depending on effort at time t (E(t)). Then the social planner's 89 problem can be formally described as:
(p(t) * Q(E(t), X(t)) − C(E(t)))e
−rt dt (1)
s.t.Ẋ (t) = f (X(t), t) − Q(t)
This equation illustrates that the planner is to maximize the total present value profits by 91 choosing the optimal effort path between 0 and T (a maximum time after which individuals 92 are dead or highly dispersed), where r is the instantaneous discount rate. The constraint de-93 scribes the stock (X(t)) dynamics consisting of a growth component (f (X(t), t)) and harvest we can specify stock dynamics as the following:
(Q(t)). Combining biological models for annual species (Fontaine and
Neal
97Ẋ (t) = X(t)[−m(t) − φA(t) +Ẇ (t) W (t)
] − Q(t)
1 if bottom dissolved oxygen is below 2 mgl −1 (the standard measure of hypoxia). The coeffi- effect is the product of this constant and the occurrence of stress, the instantaneous effect is 121 time-dependent. In the analytical model and in our numerical simulations, we treat A(t) as if 122 it is known throughout the planning period. This is a simplification in order to gain analytical 123 and numerical insights about the potential for managers to adapt to environmental stresses. In 124 reality, managers would not know the exact timing of episodic environmental stresses like hy-125 poxia ex ante, but they can often predict the seasonal concentration of stress events. Relaxing 126 the assumption of a deterministic A(t) could be a fruitful direction for future research.
127
Furthermore, we specify the catch and cost functions with standard assumptions from the 128 literature. More specifically,
129
Q(t) = q * E(t) * X(t)
where q is a constant, called the catchability coefficient. For the cost function, we assume that 130 the total cost is proportional to the effort:
In this expression, c is a positive constant. With all the expressions of the profit structure 132 and stock dynamics, we can fully characterize the social planner's problem in the following:
(p(t)qE(t)X(t) − cE(t))e −rt dt (6)
s.t.Ẋ (t) = X(t) * (−m(t) − φA(t) +Ẇ (t) W (t)
) − qE(t)X(t)
Where L(t) is the fish length, L ∞ is the maximum length and N 0 is the initial stock number.
134
The biological equations and parameters are introduced and defined in the Appendix A.Ē is 135 the capacity limit for each day's effort; i.e. the effort level is never greater than this limit. Note 136 that we use a finite-horizon model to characterize the annual fishery. 
The solution to the social planner's problem
138
In this section, we derive the solution to the annual fishery in the presence of ecological stress.
139
With the model specification in the social planner's problem (Equation 6), the solution is the 
The current-value co-state variable λ(t) represents the shadow value of additional stock,
148
i.e. the benefit of increasing the stock marginally. Note that the Hamiltonian is linear in the 149 control. As a result, the first necessary condition is:
where σ(t) is the switching function as defined in Clark (1990) . The problems in which the
151
Hamiltonian is linear in the control are characterized by a bang-bang solution such that the 152 control is at the maximum level, the minimum level, or follows a singular path (Spence and
153
Starrett 1975; Clark 1990). For our problem, the bang-bang solution is:
where a '*' indicates the optimal path. Although our problem is non-autonomous, the intuition 
Lastly, because our environmental stress variable A(t) is not continuous, we require addi-163 tional conditions. Specifically, following Caputo (2005), we require:
where τ is a switch point in A(t 
204
Before we analyze the hypoxia effect on the optimal harvest strategy, we first derive the 205 optimal strategy when there is no hypoxia. Figure 3 shows the optimal harvest and stock paths. We find that the baseline optimal harvest has an inverse U-shape with a peak in the 216 summer time, which is consistent with the actual seasonal shrimp fishery. In these two cases, the starting point of harvest is similar, while a higher catchability leads to a higher peak harvest 218 and a later season closing date. Intuitively, higher catchability implies that it is profitable to 219 fish the stock to a lower level.
220
The second row of Figure hypoxia decreases the benefits of waiting to harvest.
257
From Figure 4 , the optimal harvest paths suggest that we should set adaptive strategy" is shown by the lines with diamonds in the figure.
284
In order to show clearly the magnitude of the efficiency loss due to suboptimal policies,
285
we calculate the rents for different harvest strategies and report them in Table 2. This table   286 describes sixteen combinations of parameters. While the line with "Optimal(φ = 0)" describes 287 the baseline case where there is no hypoixa, the line with "Optimal(φ > 0)" reports the rent 288 when there is hypoxia, the planner takes the hypoxia into account and derives the correct 289 optimal strategy. The following lines denoted with "Adaptive strategy" and "N on − adaptive 290 strategy "record results in two suboptimal policy cases described above. In this with φ = 0 (no impact of hypoxia on the fishery). Policy loss is the difference between the 293 adaptive strategy (or " Non-adaptive strategy") and the optimal rent with φ >0. In addition,
294
the policy loss percentage is derived by dividing the policy loss by the rent of "Optimal(φ > 295 0)". Given all these parameter combinations, the effort level is always binding and equal toĒ.
296 Table 2 shows that the rent loss due to hypoxia is big in both absolute and relative magni- hypoxia. In fact, for many fishing dates, the profit is negative, which results in negative total 306 profits for some of the simulations. We also note that the policy losses for cases 5 and 6 with 307 lower hypoxia effects are the same. This outcome is due to T 1 equaling to T (the terminal time 
311
For the non-adaptive strategy, since there are negative fishing profits on some days and the 312 model is deterministic, the regulator could easily avoid these losses in reality. When negative 313 profit days are discarded from the non-adaptive strategy, the non-adaptive strategy is very 314 close to the adaptive strategy and even coincides with it in some cases as discussed above. As 315 such, we focus on the policy loss from the adaptive strategy. In all the sixteen cases in Table   316 2, the biggest policy loss relative to hypoxia loss for adaptive strategy is 13.55%. The fishery 317 management gains from adapting to hypoxia are thus relatively small with these parameters.
318
Discussion
319
In this paper, we develop a stylized bioeconomic model for optimal harvest of an annual 320 species (shrimp) in the presence of environmental degradation (hypoxia) that has growth con-
321
sequences. In the absence of hypoxia, the optimal harvest path is longer or shorter depending 
328
When hypoxia is introduced, we find that the optimal harvest path changes qualitatively.
329
In particular, as hypoxia worsens, the optimal season opening shifts earlier. 
464
In general, the stock at time t can be represented as the following:
In this function, N (t) is the number of individuals at time t and W (t) is the weight of each 466 individual, so the total biomass (X(t)) is the product of number and weight. Furthermore, the 467 number of fish can be modeled as a function of initial number and the mortality rate:
Here, N 0 is the initial number in each season, which is independent of last season's stock 469 and determined by nature. That is, we assume exogenous recruitment at t=0. In addition, m(t)
470
is the instaneous mortality rate, thus the total mortality at time t is an integration of m(t) over 471 time. Because larger fish are typically subject to less predation, m(t) can be further modeled 472 as:
In this equation, L(t) is the fish length and β and ρ are two parameters. We know that the 474 number of fish decreases over time, so β > 0, and ρ < 0 reflects the marginal mortality rate number of fish and weight W (t), which can also be modeled with an allometric function of 482 fish length with parameters ω and η.:
We require ω > 0 and η > 0 to ensure that shrimp weight increases over time with an 484 upper limit. Until now, the stock dynamics are due to natural growth without ecological stress.
485
However, there might exist water pollution or some other stressor that influences growth.
486
X(t) = N (t) * W (t) * e 
490
With all the above equations, we are able to take the derivative of X(t) with respect to t,
At this point, the stock is expressed as a differential equation of mortality rate, weight and 492 the hypoxia effect without harvest. If we include harvest, this equation becomes:
This equation is exactly the one we use as Equation 3 in the text for the stock dynamics.
494
The shape of the pristine stock dynamics is depicted in Figure 1 : Table 1 .
In this Appendix, we detail the numerical solution to the social planner's problem. 
where cons X is an unknown constant. This constant can be determined using the known 501 initial condition N 0 (the number of individuals that recruit into the fishery in a given year).
502
Thus, according to X 0 = N 0 * W (0), we can solve for cons X to obtain:
To understand the evolution of the co-state variable, it is convenient to rewrite Equation 10 504 as:
We now consider the extreme cases of when the control is at its maximum (Case A) and 506 when the control is 0 (Case B). To understand the control rule, we can combine Equations 8 507 and 9. When the control is at the maximum (Case A), the following is true:
control is 0 (Case B), the following is true: the control never turns on again.
540
The following algorithm is used to determine the remaining constants of integration and 541 the switch points in the control problem. 7) Choose the T 0 that leads to the highest present value profits.
552
As a check on the above, we solve the problem without using optimal control theory and 553 instead using Matlab's FMINCON and a discretization of the time and control space. Specifi-554 cally, we discretize E(t) from 0 toĒ, T 0 from 0 to T , where T is 365 days, and T 1 from T 0 to T in 555 each simulation. Then for each combination we calculate the total present value profits for ev-556 ery possible effort path. Lastly, we choose the highest profit level. The solutions are the same 557 for all combinations of parameters that we report in Table 2 ; we find only slight differences 558 that are attributable to the discretization. Table 1 and p = 2, c = 150, q = 0.001 and φ = 0.003. Note: Reports efficiency losses for different harvest strategies and parameter combinations, including low and high impacts of hypoxia (φ), two levels of catchability (q), marginal harvest cost (c), and shrimp price (p). 
